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15 July 1954

1. I contacted Dr. DOCHEV by phone at 1230. I phoned the YMCA from a phone booth at the Railroad Station. The desk clerk said DOCHEV was in and got him on the phone. I identified myself as [redacted] and asked if he could see me at 1300. He agreed. I said I'd meet him in the lobby of the YMCA.
2. I found him sitting in the lobby of the YMCA at 1256 when I entered. I recognized him from his picture (although he looks older) and his "blue suit and blue necktie". I introduced myself as [redacted], sat down with him on the sofa a few moments; showed him my half of a torn folder; he produced his half, and, at my suggestion, went to lunch. We walked over to the Sheraton-Kimball, where I was staying. I learned he did not care for a drink, nor does he smoke, so we went straight to the dining room, which is just off the lobby.
*no names
given?*
3. We had only been seated a few moments when I looked up to see an old acquaintance greeting me, with, "Hello, Don, where have you been". I recognized him as a Mr. Wells (Len Wells, I believe) who used to be one of my assureds when I worked for the Mason Insurance Agency! He said he had tried to catch my eye when I sat down, but since he couldn't, came over to my table. Seeing that this could soon become embarrassing (with DOCHEV listening) I spotted his table where his wife was sitting and moved over to speak to her. She asked what I was doing and I said I was taking a few days off to take care of some personal business and expected to stop off in New Hampshire over the weekend to see some friends, and assured them I would try to stop by and see them. (with the thought of postponing further conversation now.) A few words were said by Mr. and Mrs. about McCarthy, etc., was I in Washington, etc., I said I was, but that I was prospecting for a job in private business. They suggested Keene, but I said I was thinking of N. Y. Then, after wishing them well, I excused myself and returned to my table, mentally wiping my brow!
4. I apologized to Dr. DOCHEV, saying they were old acquaintances whom I had not seen in years who were passing through. (I had previously ascertained that they were leaving for Keene this afternoon.) After this, I made it a point to restrict conversation to general topics such as his family, his business, business conditions in Canada, etc.

I cannot say for certain, but I do not believe Dr. DOCHEV overheard my true name. If he did, he made no mention of any such suspicion.
5. After returning to my table, I told Dr. DOCHEV he should let me "buy" him an American drink, to which he agreed. I ordered two Daiquiris - he said he liked it, although said he would only have one.

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6. As soon as we finished lunch, we came up to my room for our meeting. I started by saying that I had come to meet him in response to his request and that I was ready to listen to whatever he had to say. Before we went any further, however, I said I must know whether he was in the employ of any other service. He said he was not. I asked about CIS, BIS specifically, whether he had approached them. He said he had not. Had they approached him? No. Any other service? He stated firmly and positively that he had not worked for any foreign IS except for "American Military Intelligence" while he was in Germany after the war. He said that was four years ago and that he had done nothing since, but earn his own living and do his own "organizational work".
- I pointed out that our government was on very friendly terms with Canada and England, and would wish to have no discussions with him if he were in any way working for either of them. Also, that we could check his statement by asking these services.
8. I also pointed out that our government had reports on him as being a Nazi, Fascist, collaborator, a political charlatan, etc., and that he was not very highly regarded there. I added that we would be willing to listen to whatever he had to offer including any explanation about his prewar and postwar activity.
9. He denied that he had ever been a Nazi-collaborator, but stated that his activity had been pro a strong Bulgaria and anti-communist. He pointed out that he had organized the National Legions in the early 30's and that it had been declared illegal by the government before the war.
10. He then launched into a long statement about the strength of the Bug-Communist groups in U. S. and Canada, (particularly the latter). Latter called "Canadian-Bulgarian Club", had its own building, numerous meetings, published a paper regularly (Novo Vreme) and was able to publish regular propaganda and attacks on him (and other non-Communists) while he was nearly powerless to reply due to lack of funds to publish his paper except very occasionally. He said that this created a bad impression among the Bug emigres because they could read the propaganda and accusations in NOVO VREME and NARODNA VOLYA, but could not read any counter-propaganda or rebuttals when he could not afford to publish his paper, which he claimed was the only non-Communist Bug paper in the U. S. and Canada, except, of course, for the MAKEDONSKA TRIBUNA.
11. In this connection, I asked him what support he got for his paper and how he printed it. He replied that he paid most of the cost out of his own pocket with very few contributions from his friends. He has it printed by the Ukrainian press in Toronto which publishes two (2) Ukrainian anti-communist papers called HOMINI UKRAINA, and UKRAINSKI ROBITNIK. He added that there was a large Ukrainian population (60-70,000) in and around Toronto, and that they cooperated with the BNF people and vice versa on certain anti-commie programs.
12. I then asked him why it was, if he and his group had anything to offer, that it was not possible to hold meetings, stir up interest, get people to donate work and even small contributions, hold picnics, "vecherinki", concerts, lectures, etc., without any financial support?

*See memo
of 13 Nov 53
indicated by
Zapper 1948
to present 7.*

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DOCHEV replied that he was and had been holding meetings, lectures, etc., but that the main factor was this: that his group took in as members only those who were of the "new emigration" made up of younger people and those who were "politically-minded" and that these people, being recent arrivals, were working full-time earning enough to live and had little time, money, or energy to contribute to the "cause". He further said that his "action" group must be made up only of this kind of persons since they were the only ones who would be willing and able to give themselves to clandestine work; that the older emigrants (those in America for 15, 20, 30, 40 years had no intention of returning to Bulgaria, and wanted little or no part in any such activity. He said if he developed a "going" organization with a regular paper, and some activity, the older group would help out financially, at least, and support him probably in other ways, such as showing themselves as in the anti-commie camp rather than being totally indifferent, or from lack of anything else, reading NOVO VREME and going to the Commie Clubs functions. He pointed out (quite truly) that a great many of the older emigrants could not read English well, if at all, and for that reason subscribed to any paper printed in Bulgarian, and attended functions of the Commie Club because they spoke and understood little English.

13. I asked how the Canadian-Bulgarian Club got its money if it wasn't from contributions from a large and active membership and a large circulation of the paper. He said that they did get some money that way, but mentioned two examples of how they got money from Bulgaria:

- A. Simeon TSVETKOV is editor of NOVO VREME. He has lived in Canada for 23 years. Two years ago, he wrote in his paper that DOCHEV talked against the present regime but didn't know what he was talking about. Therefore, he, TSVETKOV, would go to Bulgaria and find out who was right. He did; stayed 3-4 months and returned with "many trunks full of Bulgarian embroidery, blouses, etc.," which he put on display in their Club house and sold. Asked where he got the money for all these things, he (TSVETKOV) said he had owned a "big house" in Bulgaria; had sold it, bought these things with the money from the sale of the house and now sold them in Canada to convert his leva into dollars.

DOCHEV commented that in all his 23 years in Canada, no one had ever heard him speak of having a house in Bulgaria. He felt morally certain that much if not all of that money went into the treasury of the Club and the paper. TSVETKOV, of course, reported that everything in Bulgaria was "just fine".

- B. Elia BEZOV - an importer in Toronto, imports large tonnage of Kashkaval and Cirene from Bulgaria and sells it in U.S. and Canada. He advertizes heavily in NOVO VREME. DOCHEV feels certain that this gimmick covers his contributions to the Club and paper.

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14. I said I could see that the anti-commie group needed "beefing up", but was not at all sure that we were the ones to throw in the money, and that I thought we would like a demonstration of what his people could do without a subsidy. I also pointed out that Bulgarians never could get together; were content to stay in little splinter groups fighting each other, thereby allowing the commies to be the strongest single group.

DOCHEV agreed that this was, unhappily, so, but made a strong point of the fact that given a little support, his group could meld a large portion of the emigration with its program since it was a non-party organization whose main purpose was liberation of Bulgaria and the re-establishment of the Tirnovo Constitution, after which its work would be done and the Bulgarian people could choose its own form of government and belong to any party they wished.

15. Here, DOCHEV gave me the BNF, 3-point program:

- I. Fight against Communism for Liberation of Bulgaria.
- II. Restoration of Tirnovo Constitution.
- III. Win Friends in Western World who can help in Fight against Communism.

16. In this connection, I asked how he felt about King Simeon II. He replied that the Tirnovo Constitution provided for a constitutional monarchy; therefore, he stated that if the Constitution were restored, it would give Simeon the right to return as King. He reiterated, however, that this would be a decision up to the Bulgarian people after liberation, and not a bridge he would cross now, emphasizing that free elections after liberation would determine this.

17. DOCHEV pointed out that Simeon II would be 18 next June (1955) and therefore old enough to be King in his own right. He also mentioned that he had written Col. Marchev (Markov?), ADC to the Queen, asking about the Royal Family's views on restoration of monarch, etc., but that Col. M. had replied that it was too early to say anything definite now.

18. I gained the impression that DOCHEV favored a monarchy, but did not wish to commit himself fully at this time. Apparently, he, like many others familiar with Bulgaria and the Balkans, feels that the time is not yet ripe for what we are pleased to call Democracy in Bulgaria, and that a modified form of republicanism plus a constitutional monarch would be far better for the country. (At the risk of going out on a limb, I must say that I agree with this position. England still finds it useful. I think we often make the mistake in politics as well as religion, refrigerators, etc., of firmly believing that "what is good for us is good for everyone", overlooking the fact that the background, economy, mores, etc., of a given country may be quite different from ours.)

NOTE: (This brings to mind the fact that a certain wealthy retired U.S. statesman was supposed to invite Simeon to his home in the U.S. this summer. Let's query Paris about this.)

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19. DOCHEV emphasized that his group, BNF, was not a political party, but a liberation movement whose objective and reason d'etre would be accomplished upon the liberation of Bulgaria from Communism. At that time his organization could be dissolved. Asked if he had political ambitions in post-liberation Bulgaria, he said that was something else - if the Bulgarians elected him to an office, he might serve. However, he emphasized that his one objective was to liberate his country. He said he could not remain in Canada or U.S.; he must return to his homeland; that when the time for an active resistance movement came, he must lead his hard-core cadre of "partizan" into Bulgaria where he would personally lead his men. He stated emphatically that he could not sit idly back in safety and send his men in; he had always led his men and must do so again.
20. I pointed out that while I admired his courage and purpose, I could not agree to consider him in connection with clandestine info-gathering if he were insistent on exposing himself (with his knowledge) to 90% sure capture. DOCHEV readily agreed with this, saying he had no intention of doing this until the "open fight" began, and would not consider going into Bulgaria with or as an info agent, as he fully recognized how this would jeopardize not only lives, but a whole program.
21. Along this line, he told me that about 2-3 weeks ago, he had received a letter from a Bulgarian-Jewish dentist, a close friend of DOCHEV's brother (an M.D.) in Bulgaria who had recently migrated to Israel. The dentist (NU) said that DOCHEV's brother told him before he left that he would soon have to write a letter (under Militia direction) to DOCHEV saying that if DOCHEV did not return to Bulgaria, it would go hard with him and their mother. He told the dentist to tell DOCHEV to pay no attention to this as it would be under duress, and that his return to Bulgaria could not help them and would only be playing into hands of commies. DOCHEV added that he had not written to anyone in Bulgaria since 1944, nor had he received any letters from his brother or mother.
22. His brother is about 35, graduated from Med School in 44, started practice, interned 5 yrs. in camp, let out and now apparently was being used as doctor by regime. His mother is in late 70's. (Full details his biographic data and family will be mailed to me before he leaves U.S.)
23. Early in our talk, DOCHEV made a great point of fact that he wanted to be able to counteract commie propaganda of Bug-Commie group in U.S. and Canada. Said he'd like very much to be able to start up his paper in AUGUST in order to build steam for a Protest Meeting in Toronto on 5 September to remind everyone this was the tenth (10th) year of Communism in Bulgaria. It turned out that the American-Bulgarian League is holding its convention in Toronto 4-5 Sept (Sat. and Sun) and DOCHEV had arranged with Iliev, President of ABL, to let the ABL out for two hours to attend the Protest Meeting. DOCHEV believes this will be one thing they can do to counteract the commie propaganda, but said the more publicity he could give it the more people he could get to attend, the more successful it would be. (I agree)

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NOTE: Since 9 Sept is on a week day, and 5 Sept is a Sunday, the meeting will be on Sunday. He has already arranged for the use of the Orthodox (non-MPO) Church hall for the meeting. Hopes for 300-400 people.

24. His next point was that he wanted to form a cadre of some 300 men selected for combat duty as partizani "come the day". These men will be trained and equipped for the day when the time is ripe for guerrilla warfare in Bulgaria.
25. He then touched on the idea of "winnowing" over all his men to come up with about 10 of the best for IS agents. This, he feels, is of great importance and must be started soonest. He would like to be able to start next spring with at least one or two men to go into the country. Asked from where he would plan to send them in, he seemed to think primarily of Greece. He was very emphatic about not letting the Greeks know anything about this business. (One of the reasons for this is that he has apparently been told that it was the Greeks who picked up Diko, gave him an office, gave him funds to build an organization, send teams to Bulgaria who went straight to DS and "sang". He was quite bitter about this as he felt that this had brought about a cessation of American activity putting several of his boys (MARINOV, BAKAROV, etc.) out of business, also blew names, routes, training, etc., to the Bugs.
- PP
26. I made a great point of the necessity for knowing your agent "from before", i.e., before 9/12/44. He said he would not use anyone unless either he or one of his trusted men knew the man before. He said this was the value of working through a PA; him for instance! I agreed that this system might have some merit, but that it also had disadvantages, particularly in that it usually involved insecure transmittal of information via open mail.
27. I then asked him about his organization, how many members, where, who were the leaders, etc. He said that the Bulgarian National Front had about 1500-1600 active members. He pointed out that he selected members only from the "new emigration" and the younger men. By "new emigration" he means those who have come out of Bulgaria since 1944, or generally since WW II. The other qualification for membership was that the persons should be "politically-minded". I gathered that this phrase meant not only that the person should be interested in and knowledgeable about politics, but that he should also be mentally and physically prepared to combat Communism.

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28. The following is the list of chapters of his organization and the presidents:

CANADA - (about 200 members)

Toronto Angel GANDERSKI
Montreal Asparuh NIKOLOV
Hamilton Venceslav NIKOLOV
Sudbury Ivan KALAIIDZHIEV

(each of the foregoing chapters has about 10-15 members except Toronto, which has 120).

GERMANY

Munich Kiril EVDOKIMOV

FRANCE

Paris Radi SLAVOV (undoubtedly Radi Latev
SLAVOV, who was = 1

AUSTRIA

Salzburg Nedelcho PASHEV

ITALY

Rome Hristo STATEV
Trieste Kiril BAIKOUSHEV

GREECE

Camp Lavrion Maj. Nikola MUTAVCHIEV
(DOCHEV believes MUTAVCHIEV has left Greece, but is not sure
when or where, said he had been into Bulgaria on a mission.)

TURKEY

Istanbul Sava BEROV

AUSTRALIA

Adelaide Ivan DENCHEV
(DOCHEV says has four groups in Australia and DENCHEV heads
up all four.)

NEW ZEALAND

Lover Hoot (believe it or not) Atanas GEORGIEV

BRAZIL

Sao Paulo Eng. Lyuben HARALAMBOV
Belo HORIZONTE Eng. Raiko BELOPITOV

VENEZUELA

Caracas Peter DASKALOV
(I believe this is 1 1

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BOLIVIA

La Plata Eng. Vasil VOFNAKOVSKI

SPAIN

Madrid Dr. Atanas KEFSIZOV
(This is not considered as an organized group, but merely
as "friends" at this point.) I asked DOCHEV if he was
any relation to Col. Kefsizov, former CO of the Royal Guard
Regt., but DOCHEV did not think so.

U.S.A.

New York Dr. Kalin KOICHEV
Detroit Eng. Vasil VELEV
Chicago Dr. Georgi PAPRIKOV

They also have "friends" in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Los Angeles, etc.,
but no formal organization there.

29. I then asked DOCHEV to fill me in on how, when, and why, his organization got started. He said that it started with a meeting of some 50 Bulgarians in Heidelberg, Germany, in October 1948. These 50 men were all personal friends of DOCHEV's whom he had known in Bulgaria before 1944, and in whom he had confidence. The general idea was to form some sort of an organization to do something about liberating Bulgaria from Communism. The consensus was that they would try to form a non-party organization the main purpose of which was to take in anyone who subscribed to certain principles (mainly the liberation of Bulgaria from Communism and the restoration of the Tirnovo Constitution). As a result of this meeting, they invited all such Bulgarians that any of them knew about to attend a meeting in December 1949. This was the organizational meeting held in Munich. An executive committee of three men was elected: Ivan DOCHEV, Hristo STATEV (Rome), Dr. Dimitur VULCHEV (Munich). There was no chairman, and, according to DOCHEV, each had equal authority, but each headed up a different phase of the work, as follows:

VULCHEV - editor of the paper (Natsionalna Bulgaria) and head of the Propaganda Department.

STATEV - in charge of relations with other organizations and groups

DOCHEV - in charge of organizational work. He said that all correspondence comes to him in Toronto, and he passes the word on all matters pertaining to the organization. (This, in effect, makes DOCHEV the executive member of the committee, and thus head man. While he makes no point of this, it is evident in everything he says that he is the "leader".)

30. I asked him about the newspaper, "natsionalna Bulgaria" that his group publishes in Munich, particularly where they got the funds to publish it. He replied that they used only funds that could be provided by the membership personally, since they did not want to be beholden to Germany, or any other power at that time; they wanted to remain independent and be able to express their own views without having a sponsor who could request that articles be slanted certain ways in order to keep up the subsidy. He added that this made it necessary to publish the paper only when they had enough money, hence the publication was irregular and infrequent.

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31. In addition to the executive committee, there is a Board which consists of the presidents of each of the local chapters. Hence the men listed in paragraph 28 would constitute the Board.
32. I asked him what his views were on the MACEDONIAN QUESTION. He said that he felt that the furor caused by MPO and IMRO was greatly exaggerated; that there was no great feeling any more among the people in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria for an autonomous Macedonia, but that the people in the U.S. and Canada were constantly whipped into a frenzy about this matter for purely business reasons. I asked what he meant by business reasons; he said that it was his firm conviction that Liuben DIMITROV et al, heading up the MPO, kept up this enthusiasm in order to keep themselves in well-paid jobs. He pointed out that Liuben DIMITROV is head of the MPO and editor of the Macedonska Tribuna and gets a salary from each job. He also mentioned that there is really very little about a free and independent Macedonia in the paper; that its content was mostly advertisements, news about picnics, meetings, weddings, etc.

DOCHEV went on to say that he felt it was exactly the wrong thing to do at this point to make any noise about a free and independent Macedonia; he felt that the first and major point was a free and independent Bulgaria; that if that were achieved, then would be time to talk about Macedonia. He also pointed out that at a time when we were all bending our efforts toward fighting Communism, when we were asking Greeks, Turks, Yugoslavs, etc., to help liberate countries behind the Iron Curtain (Bulgaria), that it made no sense at all to antagonize those people by telling them that we should fight the Greeks to obtain a free Macedonia, likewise the Jugs, and so forth. (This is a very sound point, and one that has long caused problems in our relations with the Greeks, who greatly fear a strong Macedonian movement. It will be recalled that even the small group of IMRO boys who made up the THORAX operation caused the Greeks no small amount of worry. It will also be recalled that the Greeks made a good deal of the fact that they claimed they had evidence that GAMMA was really an IMRO man, citing the fact that he was born in a little town now in Greek Macedonia, formerly in Bulgarian Macedonia. Therefore, it becomes more than clear that any infiltration of the idea of a free Macedonia (meaning the loss of the greater part of northern Greece) into the picture when we are planning to utilize Greek forces in any forthcoming conflict with Communism in that area, would be disastrous, regardless of the rights and wrongs involved.)

DOCHEV further stated that he knew Ivan MIHAILOV personally, had, in fact, hidden him out in Austria after WW II, and obtained false documentation for him so that he could cross the border into Italy. He explained that he had been working for CIC at the time, and had gotten the documentation from them without revealing to them that it was actually for MIHAILOV. (this may or may not be so; it is possible, but should be checked.)

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He went on to say that MIHAILOV had been very angry at him (DOCHEV) because of the following incident: that in 1950, MIHAILOV had submitted a report to the American Military in Germany saying in effect that he had thousands of men ready and willing to spring to arms and overthrow the government of Yugoslavia if the U. S. would supply him with arms. DOCHEV was asked by CIC to comment on this, and he, DOCHEV, had replied that he thought that MIHAILOV's report was greatly exaggerated; that he undoubtedly did have a few followers who would rise if MIHAILOV gave the word, but that it constituted nowhere near the force that MIHAILOV claimed. DOCHEV thought that word of this must have leaked to MIHAILOV as shortly after he arrived in Canada, at which time the Macedonians had been most cordial to him, a letter arrived from MIHAILOV telling all the MPO people that DOCHEV was their enemy, and not to help or support him in any way.

33. As the American-Bulgarian League had come into the conversation several times, I asked DOCHEV what he felt about the League, and whether he thought that it served any useful purpose. DOCHEV replied that he thought that it had no great significance as far as his aims were concerned, primarily because the stated aims were those of establishing good relations between Bulgarians and Americans. He made a point of the fact that while he agreed with this aim 100%, and thought that it was something that definitely needed doing because of the fact that the Bulgarians enjoyed a rather dubious reputation in the U. S. and Canada, he said that their membership was made up mostly of people who had come here to make this their homeland, and had little or no intention of returning to Bulgaria, and therefore, had very little interest in undertaking any action that would involve them in espionage, armed resistance, propaganda; in short, they would not be particularly valuable in the sort of work he planned to engage in and desired our help for.
34. He went on to say, however, that he had a high regard for most of the people he knew in the League, and that they had worked together successfully on a number of occasions. He again mentioned the cooperation that existed between the League and his own people in Toronto, and elsewhere at the time the League Convention had been held in Toronto. He also referred to his most amicable arrangements with Mr. ILIEV, (pres. of ABL) with regard to cooperating in his protest meeting on 5 September 1954.
35. DOCHEV was, however, concerned about the affiliation of such persons as KOBUROV in New York, whom he described as a Communist or Communist-sympathizer. He pointed out that anyone who traded with the Communist government of Bulgaria was being of material assistance to that regime and could not very well take his place in the ranks of the Anti-Communists.

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36. DOCHEV also mentioned his concern about the fact that the Orthodox Church had many Communist members. He had no good solution for this (and I did not pursue this topic), but felt that the root of the trouble was that Bishop Andrey did not recognize the danger of his group being penetrated and the dissension that existed within the Church as a result of this penetration.
37. Just to bring this report back into focus again, I shall put down now the sequence of the above-mentioned events. Most of this discussion took place the afternoon of 15 July 1954 in my hotel room. At about 1800, I suggested that we break up for a couple of hours in order for him to review some of his plans in his own mind and for me to review what he had told me. I asked him to prepare in writing a precise statement of his proposal, in order that I might have it exactly as he wanted it expressed. We agreed to meet again in my room at 2130 that night.
- At 2130 he returned to my room and handed me several pages of handwritten material in Bulgarian. He apologized for not having been able to finish all he had to say, and asked if he could have more time to complete his proposal. I agreed, saying that if he could have it by the next morning, it would be all right. We agreed to meet in my room again at 1000 hours on 16 July. We then spent an hour or so in further discussion of certain of his other problems, after which he excused himself and left the room. I spent the rest of the evening in reviewing my notes and writing up the events of the day.
38. At 1000 hours on 16 July, DOCHEV came to my room with a sheaf of papers he had written since last night. When we sat down, I told him that we had received numerous "broad plans" from several emigre leaders and that I wanted him to understand that we would not give any consideration whatever to anything but very specific plans that had some chance of success. I pointed out that this meant exact names and biographic data of the men who were to be recruited; specific persons inside Bulgaria and what exactly they could be expected to do for us, just how he proposed to get his prospective agent from where he was at the moment to the interior of Bulgaria, contact the man, obtain information, and then get the information to us. I asked him if he had such plans in mind at this time.
39. DOCHEV said that he recognized that this was what we needed, and said that he could not supply that type of plan now. That could only come, he said, after he had carefully reviewed the persons available, personally talked with them to determine if they were suitable for the work now (he said he would not get in touch with anyone in whom he had not had confidence as of the time he last talked with him), or whether they might have changed to such an extent that they would no longer be suitable. He said that he could produce such plans at a later date. I replied that I was disappointed in this as I had assumed

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that he would come prepared with this sort of information. He said that he had assumed that this sort of thing would come later, after we had assessed him and decided that we wanted to work with him, or have him work for us.

- Name*
40. I then asked him why he had stopped working for U. S. Military Intelligence in Germany. He replied about as follows: he said that he had never been in direct contact with any Americans in this work, but that he had been handled only by a German P/A. He said that this had not been very satisfactory for a number of reasons. For one thing, he maintained that the German was only interested in results versus money paid, and that frequently he felt that his P/A withheld some of the monies due him. He also said that the P/A interfered too much in his work, and did not allow him to follow through on some work that he (DOCHEV) felt that he would accomplish. He cited as an example, a certain agent whom he, DOCHEV, had recruited in Germany and sent into Bulgaria, to gather intelligence. He said that this man had good connections with the Communist regime, and, as such, was free to travel to and from Bulgaria, and to obtain information that a non-Communist or at least a non-Communist sympathizer would not have access to.
41. He related that fact that the man had gotten to Sofia and had obtained information but had been unable to get out of Bulgaria to return to Germany. DOCHEV said the man communicated with him, and told him this, saying that if he could have a certain amount of money, he would be able to escape from his surveillance in Sofia, head for the mountains, and escape to the free world. Although DOCHEV claims he pled with the German P/A to obtain the money, he did not get it, and never heard from the agent again. He said that his feeling was that he could not justify having failed to do all he thought he reasonably should have done for his agent before giving him up as lost, but that he had been unable to convince his German P/A of this reasoning. He pointed out that the fact that he was obliged to tell the man's wife (who lived in Germany with three children) that he did not know what could have happened to her husband. This kind of thing went against his grain, and was one of the contributing causes (he says) to his deciding to leave the service and emigrate.
42. Another reason was the fact that although he had a good penetration of the Bulgarian Legation in Vienna, and was getting information from it that was very useful, he was censured for the fact that his agent was a Communist. His argument to his PA was that if he had not been a Communist, it would not have been possible for him to obtain the type of information that he was furnishing. In spite of this eminently reasonable argument, the PA told him that he should be let go.

(I cannot say how much of this is true, and how much of it is eyewash to make me think that he was and is a real hot operator, and that he left this job of his own free will and not because he was fired. It is, however, gratifying to note that he has a firm grasp

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of the very simple but oft overlooked fact that if you are going to get information about what goes on inside a Legation, you have to hire an agent who can get in and out regularly and freely.)

43. He said that he migrated to Canada because he felt that he could do little in Europe at that time, and he felt that it was better for him to go to Canada, earn a living, and prepare for the day when he could do something toward the liberation of his country. The matter of how he has made his living in the trucking business and his efforts with his newspaper, organization, etc. have been covered elsewhere.

44. I asked DOCHEV to what political party he had belonged in Bulgaria, having in mind the fact that he had listed himself in an application as being sec-gen of the Agrarian Party. At first, he misunderstood (at least he appeared to), and started talking about how the Bulgarian National Legion was not a political party; I interrupted and explained that I meant actual political party. He replied that he had never belonged to a political party as such, but that in 1938, when all political parties were outlawed, a number of "professional" organizations had sprung up, but that all of them had political aims underneath even though they had laudable "professional" aims on the surface. The outlawed political party was called the Bulgarian Peoples Agrarian Union. The "professional" group (organization) was known as the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. He says that none of the old leaders of the Agrarian Party (Bulgarian Peoples Agrarian Union) joined the "professional" organization, but stayed on the sidelines until it was possible to enter into a political party.

NOTE: I don't know how accurate this is, and it should not be accepted as gospel until it is carefully checked out. It sounds generally right from what I know of the situation at that time. I know that political parties were outlawed for some time, and that "professional" organizations were formed, but whether this particular one is as he has described it or not, I can't say.

45. DOCHEV said that at the same time he was sec-general of the Bulgarian National Legions, which had to operate clandestinely since that, too, had been outlawed. He added, however, that since this organization was anti-Communist, and the government was strongly anti-Communist and interested in locating and arresting all Commies, the police were inclined for the most part to wink at his activities with the Legion, and not to bother them, as long as they did not meet openly.
46. I asked DOCHEV to give me a quick breakdown of the dates of the Legion. He gave me the following:

Formed in 1928, mainly of high school students. Later, older men (roughly 20-40) were taken in, but still 90% of membership was made up of young men.

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First Outlawed: 1934 in coup d'etat of May 19.
Permitted: 1935 - 38
Again outlawed: 1938; DOCHEV in jail one year.
From this time on the Legion was illegal.

47. In this connection, he told me that Dr. Kalin KOICHEV, his representative in New York now, had worked with him (DOCHEV) in Bulgaria and elsewhere for the past twenty (20) years; that he had had a great deal of experience in clandestine work due to the fact that he had worked on Legion matters for a number of years during most of which time the Legion had been in illegal status. He added that he had great confidence in KOICHEV's ability, security, loyalty, etc.

48. I then asked DOCHEV about what Bulgarians he knew in Canada who were recent emigres. He gave me the following names and brief info on each:

- N.B.
- a. Gospodin GOSPODINOV: [] - described as being a young man whom DOCHEV had known before 1944, a member of the Legion, a very able, loyal man who had had some experience in Greece where he had worked for the Americans; he has not been into Bulgaria on any missions. DOCHEV felt that he would be most useful in giving him (DOCHEV) recent and reliable information about Bulgarians in Greece who could be useful to us in the fight against Communism. He said he did not plan to use him for any kind of mission into Bulgaria, or, outside of Canada.
 - b. Vulcho VULCHEV: he did not say much about him, except that he was a good, loyal man, who had done some work for the Americans in Greece, and that he would use him in much the same manner as he would use GOSPODINOV.
 - c. TARALFSHKOV, FNU: [] - said he could not recall his first name, but that he had known TARALFSHKOV in Bulgaria before 1944; that he had been an army captain; had done some work for the Americans in Greece; he had confidence in him as being a loyal Bulgarian; but that he would use him only to gather information on people in whom he had some operational interest.

49. I did not take time to query him fully on these people as time was running short, and I felt that if we decided to enter into contractual relations with DOCHEV, there would be ample time to interrogate him fully about all the people he knew of or mentioned.

50. He then went on to tell me about some of the Bulgarians he knew in Greece. They are as follows:

- 100-1000
- a. Hristo MARINOV: he is presently in Camp LAVRION; has been in Bulgaria on missions; DOCHEV knows and trusts him, feels he is very able; says that MARINOV wrote him from LAVRION asking DOCHEV to help him get to Canada; but said that he wants MARINOV to stay put in Greece in the event that he would have something for MARINOV to do; says he will write him to sit tight, that he (DOCHEV) will work on his case, but that it will take several months.

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- b. BAHAROV, FNU: DOCHEV knows him from before, says he is an army lieutenant, good man, has had operational experience, is presently in Camp LAVRION, and that he feels BAHAROV would be very valuable to us.
- c. CHONOV, FNU: a former army sgt. who had served with border troops, very good, able man in late 40's; has had experience on missions in Bulgaria; knows RHODOPI Mountains extremely well, knows POMAKS well, gets on well with them and has numerous contacts among them; has worked for the Americans there; but has now left, he thinks for Australia.

NOTE: [

I did not indicate that I knew him or any of the other people he mentioned, although DOCHEV himself said in passing that I probably knew of some of the people he mentioned.

- 51. DOCHEV said that he also knew Diko DIKOV (Diko Adamov DIMITROV) and something about his activities in Greece. He said that he had known him in Bulgaria during WW II; that he had been about the tag-end of the Pladne Agrarians whom even the Agrarians didn't have much use for; that he understood that he had been picked up by the Greeks, who set him up in an office in Athens, gave him money and assisted him in forming the National Bloc, and in recruiting and sending teams into Bulgaria. He said that Diko's agents were uniformly bad eggs, that the first thing they did was to report to the Militia or DS and reveal all they had learned in training, etc., which resulted in the blowing of numerous other agents, operations, safehouse, etc. As a result of this, DOCHEV feels, a number of the American agents and operations had to be cashiered. This, he believes, accounted for a great many agents being dropped and sent to LAVRION, SYROS, etc. This is what he thinks accounts for our dropping the people he has mentioned above, such as GOSPODINOV, BAHAROV, VULCHEV, CHONOV, etc. This whole episode, he feels, was pretty bad going, and he blames the Greeks entirely for it. This made him say that if we (he and the U.S.) ever mounted any operations from Greece, that the Greeks should not be cut in on them at all, that they should be entirely restricted to American personnel.

NOTE: As long as he seemed to think that the Greeks were responsible for the Diko affair, I did not attempt to disabuse him of this, nor to question him too fully or with the type of leading question [

- 52. At this point, I took up with him the question of how he would work for us, if, indeed a decision were taken to do business with him and his co-religionaries. I told him that my interview with him would have to be reported in full in Washington, and that it would be very carefully considered. If it were felt that there were any merit in him or his men or plans, that further meetings would be held with him, very probably by other persons than myself, to go into minute details of any proposed undertaking. I pointed out that in such a case, it would be necessary to work

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out a very detailed contractual arrangement with him, stipulating his exact relationship with us, his duties, his responsibilities, limitations of what he could and could not do and say, how much money he would receive, and how it had to be accounted for, etc.

53. He said that this seemed like a fair and workmanlike arrangement, and that it was perfectly agreeable to him. He said that he had, of course, hoped that he would be able to settle all these matters on this trip and in this meeting with me, but that he realized that it had to be otherwise. I pointed out that even had I been the person to determine this, that his plans would have to be carefully analyzed, and details worked out so that there would be no misunderstandings, and the the U. S. Government did not believe in just handing out money to anyone who asked for it, unless there seemed to be a good reason, and that contractual arrangements were entered into stipulating duties and responsibilities. At this point, I thought it might be a good idea to discuss his travel claim.
54. I had asked him the day before to prepare in writing what his itinerary and expenses had been and give it to me. He had done this the evening of 15 July. This appears in Attachment A, and covers his trip to Springfield, New York, Chicago and Detroit. I pointed out that I had not been aware of the fact that he intended to go farther than New York and return to Toronto; that I had authorization to pay him for his expenses only from Canada to Springfield and return, but that we had included his trip to New York as we agreed with him that it was necessary for him to have a cover reason for coming to the U.S. As that was the case, I said we could reimburse him for those expenses, but not for his trip to Chicago and Detroit. I pointed out that until such time as we might enter into contractual relation with him, and instruct him to take such a trip, it was entirely on his own. He readily agreed to this, saying, as he had at the time he gave me his expense and itinerary voucher, that he was not presenting it as a "bill" at all; that he did it only so that we would know what his expenses were, and that anything we wanted to give him was entirely up to us. I repeated that we felt obligated to pay him for his expenses incurred in this meeting, and would do so; but that any other expenses he had were his own affair, and that if he did not have enough money to carry out his proposed itinerary, he would have to cut it to fit his pocketbook. He said that he felt that he could make it all right as he would stay with friends wherever he went, and that he might even obtain some contributions from them if need be. This being understood and agreed, I gave him his expense money and had him sign a receipt for same which is made a part of my travel and expense voucher.
55. At this time, we went over his itinerary. He gave me a copy which appears as Attachment B.
56. He said that he would be staying with the following people on his trip:

Dr. Kalin KOICHEV (KOITSCHOFF)
107 Romein Place
Leonia, New Jersey

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Arrive evening of 16 July; depart evening 19 July.

Dr. Georgi PAPRIKOV
630 S. Hermitage Avenue
Chicago 12, Illinois

Arrive during day of 20th; depart evening of 22nd.

Dr. Eng. Wasil VFIEFF (Vasil VELEV)
140 W. Nevada
Detroit 3, Michigan

Arrive 23 July, depart any time 23 or 24 July for Toronto.

57. DOCHEV stated that his visa was good until 28 July, and that if I wanted to see him again before he returned to Canada, that he could meet me again in Springfield on 26 or 27 July. We agreed that if such should be the case, I would send him a letter or postcard to one of the above addresses saying, "I am sorry I will not be able to see you on Monday, 26 July, (or Tuesday 27 July) because you are returning to Canada", signed "Koicho", this would mean that he was to come to Springfield on the date indicated, and that I (or someone else) would meet him in the little park in front of the Hotel KIMBALL at 1100 that date. If no one was there at that hour, he was to return at 1200, and 1300, and every hour on the hour thereafter until the meeting took place. If I wrote anything else, it would mean that no one would see him, and that he was to return to Toronto.
58. I told him that I would get an address in New York where he could write me any future correspondence, and that I would try to send this to him before he left the U.S. I also gave him the Coperman box in Washington for him to write me before he left the U.S. I told him under no circumstances to write to this box after he left the U.S. He agreed to this, and added that he felt it far better for him not to write to Washington once he had returned to Toronto.
59. He further said that he would obtain a letter from one of his friends in the U.S. which he could use to obtain another visa for the U.S., and that shortly after his return to Canada, would apply for another visa which would be valid for six months and could be used at any time during that period. I agreed that this was okay.
60. At this time, I told him that he was not under any circumstances to reveal to ANYONE that he had had conversations with a representative of the U.S. Government, and that if we learned that he had so stated or even implied this, that we would have nothing further to do with him. He readily agreed to this, saying that he quite understood this, and had so arranged his trip that it would not be known to anyone. He pointed out that he was returning to Albany in order to board the regular train from Toronto to New York, and had told KOICHEV that he would arrive Friday night in New York, i.e. 16 July. (I was pleased to note that he had been smart enough to realize

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that if he came in to N.Y. on another train, his story to KOICHEV would not hold up.) This does not mean that I am convinced that he will not reveal this meeting in some form or other in the future if he feels that it is to his advantage to do so. It has to be taken into account that he might. However, I feel quite sure that he will not do so until and unless he is sure that we will not play ball with him at all. IF we do work with him, we shall have to decide what he is to tell his followers; it will become quickly obvious that he is obtaining support from some one, and he must have an answer. I am inclined to recommend that this answer be held off as long as it can, and it will go over with some people for a while that he has gotten greater contributions from some of the Bulgarians in U.S. and Canada and is thus able to spend more on his newspaper, meetings, etc., and travel more than he did. This, however, will not last very long; it is then that he will have to have an answer to satisfy at least those men whom he asks to work for us. I rather imagine that at that time, he will have to say that he has agreed to assist the U.S. with some of his "assets" and that in turn, the U.S. is supplying some of the logistical support.

61. At this point, I asked him about any connections he had with any organizations in the U.S; had he done anything about getting in touch with NCFE? He replied that he had, through Dr. KOICHEV in N.Y., and that he was supposed to see a Mr. FRASIER (his spelling) of the Bulgarian Desk of NCFE while he was in N.Y. I asked him if he planned to see this Mr. Frasier, and if so, what about? He replied that he was not at all sure that he should see Frasier, and would not, if I so directed.
62. I said that first of all I was in no position to tell him (DOCHEV) whom to see and whom not to see, but since he asked, I told him I would have no objection to his seeing Mr. Frasier and talking with him or listening to any proposal that he might make. I said, however, in view of the relationship that he DOCHEV had proposed to me, I would ask that (a) he make no commitments to Frasier, and (b) that he write me a report of what transpired at the meeting. This DOCHEV agreed to do, saying he would send it to the Coperman P.O. Box in Washington, as I had previously advised him to do with any correspondence he had with me while in the U.S. I also suggested that it might be possible that Frasier could help him with his newspaper publication which should in any event be kept separate from his IS work, but that it was too early to speculate until he had talked with Frasier.
63. DOCHEV then said that it was most important that he have some kind of overt work that should in theory, at least, keep him busy full time, and furnish his income and support. He said that he felt that the newspaper would accomplish this as he could say that he had drummed up enough enthusiasm and support in the U.S. on this trip to be able to publish another issue or two, and could probably perley it into a sort of full time job that would enable him to give up his trucking business. I told him that I agreed that he must have a cover for his IS and other covert activities, but that we would work that out later. In the meantime, I agreed that being editor-publisher of a regular newspaper might be reasonably good cover.

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64. During a break in our conversation, DOCHEV made some comments about Dimitur MATSANKIEV and Vladimir PASKALIEV. These are rather uncomplimentary in nature and are covered by separate memo.
65. This was just about the end of our meeting. I went over a few details with DOCHEV to be sure that we understood each other, before he left to catch his train. One of the reasons I had to hurry and did not have time to review some points was that he had to leave Springfield on the 1300 train for Albany in order to keep his schedule and arrive in New York when the train from Toronto-Buffalo-N.Y. got in.
66. I reviewed our arrangements for his getting in touch with me in case I should not see him again on this trip, as well as details about where and when I would see him if we did meet again before he returned to Canada. I paid him his money and got a receipt. I reiterated to him that it would probably take another meeting to clear up certain details before we would be in a position to hire him, pointing out that a great deal of careful study and planning would have to go into anything of this sort. He thanked me for coming to meet him, and expressed the hope that we would never regret a decision to work with him, which he hoped we would make, and then we said "good-bye" and he left the room at a little after 1200 on 16 July.
67. After he left, I had lunch, went to the Railroad station to verify my reservations, and to use the public phone there. I phoned C to tell him the meeting had taken place and to let him know about the possibility of another cover job. As to the latter, I said it looked promising, but that it was too early to count on yet. I asked about his wife, and learned that she was improving and was able to be out of bed a little now. I told him I would be in touch with him and would let him know when it was necessary to come to Washington, but that I did not think it would be necessary until the end of next week at the earliest.
68. I then called the office to see if anything had developed that I should know about. Rosalie told me that she did not know of anything, but that Wayne had just stepped out and she would try to reach him. This she was unable to do, so I decided to hang up.
69. I spent the rest of the afternoon in writing up my notes of the meeting, and packing up to leave. I checked out of the hotel at about 1700 on 16 July.

DFS says Dochev made no inquiries as to whom C represents. Knows he is "Intelligence".

DFS prepared Dochev for fact that if op develops, someone else will handle as to details. ht

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**Interesting
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*Half of folder used by []
to identify himself to Ivan Dochev.
Dochev had other half.*